THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY WARFARE
Our nation is in the midst of what can be best described as a grand counter-insurgency to defeat a Militant Islamic Extremist movement whose goal is the establishment of a global theocracy based on Islamic Law. 1 This is a struggle in which we will be engaged for many years to come and is now known as the Long War. 2 Coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are only the beginning of this struggle. The Department of Defense (DOD), and the Army specifically, must embrace, and if necessary, lead the combined and interagency effort during the conduct of counter-insurgency and reconstruction operations. This process, when effective, enables us to create a convergence of effects that aid in the achievement of our strategic objectives.
The enemy of the United States and much of the developed world is not terrorismterrorism is but one method of attack. The enemy is Militant Islamic Extremists, most notably associated with Al Qaeda, but also linked to other groups with similar goals worldwide. The goal of their Grand Insurgency is the establishment of theocratic global order based on their interpretation of Islamic law, or Sharia, based on the Koran. The goal of the United States and its allies must be the defeat of this grand insurgency, which is really a war of ideas. Therefore, our combined and national efforts need to evolve from a murky global war on terror to a more focused approach to the defeat of a determined, capable, and sophisticated insurgent movement. A focused joint interagency approach allows us to better pick our spots and allocate resources that are already spread thinly due to extensive ongoing commitments. Weak and failing nation-states, or what Thomas Barnett describes as "gap" countries 3 are prime breeding grounds for Militant Islamic Extremism and will continue to demand the priority of our efforts.
Failing states and those emerging from conflict will be a problem that the United States and its allies will be required to address for the foreseeable future. 4 Further, counter-insurgency operations will occur much more frequently than major land wars and rapid conventional campaigns that were the core of the Army's transformation concept. 5 The goal of the United States and its allies with regard to failed states should be effective governance which provides for the security, social and economic welfare of its citizens-an environment that is not conducive to the growth or perpetuation of Militant Islamic Extremism.
This goal can be accomplished only through skillful application of all the elements of national power in a joint, interagency, and collaborative process.
The Problem Defined
The Army and the United States Military conduct combat operations very well as illustrated by our successful military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our ability to skillfully apply military power is unmatched. An equal challenge is the skillful application of economic, diplomatic, and informational means that must be integrated into an effective counterinsurgency strategy. How do we best get public infrastructure, civil administration, law enforcement, military, and financial institutions of failed or war torn states to a functional level?
How do we achieve a "new normal," or the desired end state as outlined by our political objectives that can withstand the pressures of insurgency? 6 The Army has chosen to call these activities stability and reconstruction operations; Joint Forces Command has named them Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations; The Center for Strategic and International
Studies Bi-Partisan Commission described these activities as post -conflict reconstruction. 7 Going back to the premise that our nation is involved in a global counter-insurgency campaign, then all of these activities (reconstruction, stability, security, and transition) can be viewed as components of the counter-insurgency. The term counter-insurgency, or COIN, denotes a use of all the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) to achieve strategic objectives.
Achievement of our strategic objectives is best done through joint interagency planning, coordination, and execution, which includes our allies and non-governmental organizations. By their nature, counter-insurgency operations must be "inter-everything" if they are to be successful. "This (joint force) concept refers to joint, multi-agency, and multinational force and includes the integration and appropriate balance of conventional and special operations
forces." 8 This definition leaves out non-governmental and private voluntary organizations which must also be part of a joint effort with a shared purpose. They are a reality in both Afghanistan and Iraq and must be an integrated part of the joint operation. All of these agencies and international institutions are coming from different parts of the globe to help. They bring much needed resources, expertise, and energy, but they also bring very different assumptions, working styles, and goals.
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There are several reasons why joint, collaborative operations with a shared objective are critical to the success of ongoing and future counter-insurgency operations: (1) situational awareness, (2) inefficient use of scarce resources, (3) sending mixed signals to the host nation political leadership and population, and (4) the chance that a dysfunctional and discordant joint process can impede or reverse gains made. This is particularly true with operations on the ground and needs to be addressed in the planning phases at the National Security Council (NSC) and combatant commands to ensure that appropriate agencies are in place working collaboratively, which is critical to the success our Long War campaign. A particular challenge is the ability of other agencies in the government to resource these operations, particularly with qualified professionals to work in concert with the joint military force in the counter-insurgency.
This is particularly true with the reconstruction efforts associated with the counter-insurgency.
"Post conflict reconstruction must be approached as an intrinsic rather than an optional part of winning the war." 10 The NSC and our combatant commands have the requisite depth and expertise from outside the DOD to contribute to joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs).
The problem lies in implementation on the ground --in the provinces and districts, where there is an absence of joint interagency cooperation. Agencies outside the DOD do not have the depth required to put qualified professionals in the field. In this case, the military commander is the focal point for all aspects of the counter-insurgency by default. an unfinished school, wasted resources, and a frustrated population that views the government, even though they were really never brought into the process, as being unable to provide for their basic needs.
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Without a joint interagency structure in place on the ground, the divergent efforts of a diverse set of actors in the counter-insurgency have the strong potential to send mixed messages to the political leadership and the populace. This is true at all levels but particularly to operations on the ground, where a variety of local governmental institutions, agencies, coalition and combined forces, international institutions, and NGOs are working in the same geographic battle space. Without a unity of goals and effort, we present a weak, fragmented image of the government we are trying to stabilize and support. If the goal is effective governmental institutions which can provide for the security and welfare of its population independently, then the political messages, information campaign, military operations, development priorities, and intelligence sharing must be joint interagency, with the host nation government intricately involved and in the lead. The goal is to put a "host nation face" on the joint counter-insurgency effort.
Perhaps the most dangerous result of a counter-insurgency fought in a parallel rather than in a joint interagency process is the potential to actually impede, create negative effects, or reverse progress to the achievement of strategic objectives. Over-reliance on military power, illconceived and fragmented development strategies, and inconsistency in information operations are likely to provide well organized and coherent insurgent movements with opportunities to gain tactical and strategic advantage. The host nation government, in cooperation with an NGO, is able to get a power plant up and running, but has not shared this information or developed a security plan with military forces operating in the area for protection of the plant.
Two days later the plant is attacked and disabled by insurgent forces. 14 This fuels the perception on the part of the population that the government cannot sustain or protect their basic needs. Lack of joint cooperation can serve to undermine the government and strengthen the insurgency-a sense of hopelessness is created.
Ongoing counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are variants of models for what we as a nation and our allies will be required to conduct if we are to prevail in the larger counter-insurgency against Militant Islamic Extremism. A cookie cutter approach will not be successful. Past experience and lessons learned should serve instructive, not prescriptive roles in our operational plans. There are two aspects of counter-insurgency and reconstruction operations that are likely to be common threads in future operations. First, they will occur in failed or weak states with severely impaired political, social, and public infrastructure where the application of military power alone will not achieve our strategic objectives, and if applied improperly can worsen the situation. Sean Maloney, in a recent article on the progress in Afghanistan, asserts "that subtlety and thought be employed rather than brute force. Brute force solutions will not work in Afghanistan." 15 Secondly, the reconstruction process should begin in the shaping phase and must be executed, if necessary, concurrent with combat operations.
None of the activities associated with counter-insurgency have a clear beginning or end, and this period encompasses peacetime through the successful attainment of our strategic objectives. 16 A coordinated joint interagency effort, bringing to bear all the elements of national and international power, is required from beginning to end.
The importance of getting the interagency process right is not confined to our current counter-insurgency campaign against militant Islamic extremism. The economic security of developed nation-states is jeopardized by conflict in weak or failed nation-states. The growing inter-dependency of the world economy will make conflict a potentially more costly enterprise in terms of the economic impact it will have on many countries on the periphery of conflict and the impact on their economic systems. This will continue to grow in importance with the rapid pace of globalization and the flattening of the world. 17 Failed states not only serve as potential breeding grounds for the global Islamic extremists but also as destabilizing influences on the global economic system. Third, NSPD-44 attempts to delineate who is in the lead during an ongoing stability and reconstruction operations; it directs that "in order to maintain clear accountability and responsibility for any contingency response or stabilization and reconstruction mission, lead and supporting responsibilities for agencies and departments will be designated using the mechanism outlined in NSPD-1. These lead and supporting relationships will be redesignated as transitions are required." 23 In reviewing NSPD-1, the Organization of the National Security
Council System does not refer to any such mechanism for the designation of lead and supporting agencies. One could surmise from study of NSPD-1 that the responsibility to recommend designation of lead and supporting relationships would lie with the Stabilization and Reconstruction Policy Coordination Committee (PCC). Their recommendation would be forwarded for review and/or approval as required by the deputies and principals committees of the National Security Council with the final decision making authority resting with the President, unless he delegates the decision to a lower level. 24 There is no clear delineation to sort this out.
The issue is further muddled by stating that, "This Directive is not intended to, and does not The first major policy initiative in the directive is the designation of stability operations as a core mission for the DOD. It directs that stability operations be given "comparable" weight to combat operations and be included in the training, budgeting, manning, equipment, and education strategies of all the services. In addition to NSPD-44 and DOD Directive 3000.05, many authors, think tanks, and nongovernmental organizations have published studies which focus on the United States' capability to conduct stability and reconstruction. The majority of these studies are focused at the national level, with a few making broad references to initiatives at the brigade combat team (BCT) level, but with no specificity on the prosecution of SSTR or the composition of the joint interagency contingent on the ground. This broad top-down approach fails to get at the heart of the immediate task at hand. Our ability to defeat an insurgency or achieve stability is most affected by what happens on the ground, in concert with coalition partners, the international community, and the host nation government. 34 We can have all the good structures and policies in place at the national and combatant command level we want, but the battles are fought, schools are built, government infrastructure enabled, and governments gain credibility from the ground up.
It does not really matter much to the average Afghan or Iraqi that we have developed a post for the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization. It has minimal impact on their lives, and without extended reach will not make their lives any better in the long term. They want to see results that positively impact their daily lives. That does not happen if the extent of our interagency reach only extends as far as to Washington, Qatar, or even Kabul and Baghdad, for that matter. It comes from empowering and providing adequate resources to those operating in the field. 35 Our reach must extend into the provinces and districts.
Recommendations and Conclusions
The Department of Defense must remain the lead agency for executing a U.S stability, security, transition, and reconstruction policy that will take significant time to expand and develop as mandated by NSPD-44. The civilian capability to execute the policy outlined in NSPD-44 does not currently exist. The work started at the strategic level to move us in the right direction but it not ready to be implemented for use in current operations. This is a situation that will hopefully improve rapidly, but is likely to exist for a period of years. Implementation of NSPD-44 will take time in terms of developing a planning and coordination capability, and recruiting field officers with the requisite experience, expertise, and dedication to be valuable in the field. This is not necessarily a negative situation. Who has better knowledge of the security, political, cultural, tribal, and economic situation better than military units which interact with the populace and its local leadership on a daily basis? Are we saying that the typical battalion level commander, with 20 years experience, which typically includes multiple experiences in combat, counter-insurgency, and stability operations does not have the requisite skills to interact with government leaders, aid them in the establishment of priorities, or understand the importance of strong civil institutions? Are we really better off handing the responsibility for stabilizing a province or district to a well meaning, but inexperienced diplomat from the Department of State?
Until enough depth and experience can be built in the other members of the inter-agency, the more detailed in terms of how to achieve this at the critically important BCT level.
Third, commanders, particularly at the brigade and battalion level, must be armed with the knowledge of how to tap into development resources and be part of the implementation process of reconstruction. This can be accomplished through dedicated training at home station and during pre-deployment site surveys prior to deployment. They need the expertise to know how to get a school, road, or bridge built in concert with a development strategy driven by the host nation government. Military leaders must be equipped with the skill sets and resources to enable them to move the reconstruction process forward; to make steady progress. In his analysis of post-war occupations in Germany, Japan, and Afghanistan, and their application to Iraq, Salvatore Jennings stresses the importance of steady progression.
The impression (upon the population) that progress is being made is important. Nation building is not only a physical process but a psychological one. Maintaining modest momentum in post-war reconstruction and ensuring that the Afghans (or Iraqis) take part in the process…will be fundamental to success in the coming years. 37 Until our civilian capabilities are sufficiently bolstered, the military must be enabled to effectively assist in the attainment of steady progress.
Fourth, institutionalize the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept into joint SSTR and COIN doctrine and get them inserted into operations early. In Afghanistan, and recently in Iraq, PRTs have been established to aid in the process of maintaining momentum and focus on reconstruction. These teams have been typically led by a lieutenant colonel who is a civil affairs specialist. They typically consist of 5-10 civil affairs soldiers and ideally, representation from the USAID, USDA, and the provincial government which they are tasked to assist. Dependent on the security situation, the PRT is also augmented with a security element of 50-100 soldiers.
Their mission is to extend the authority of the government, enhance security, and facilitate humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts. 38 The first PRT in Afghanistan was established in January 2003, 16 months after the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom. 39 In future operations, PRTs should be built into the planning process and be integrated into SSTR at the onset of operations. They must be prepared to work in the midst of a counter-insurgency. We cannot wait for the "stabilize" and "enable civil authority" phases of an operation to bring in expertise from other agencies of the government. 40 While security may be lacking in one district which clearly precludes rebuilding, opportunities are likely to exist elsewhere. Missing opportunities to move the reconstruction process forward because of inadequate expertise, focus, understanding, or staffing hinders the SSTR effort. Missed opportunities add support to the insurgency, something that must be avoided.
PRTs must be staffed properly and command relationships established to ensure that unity of effort is achieved throughout a given province or region. This is vital in the face of geographic, cultural-and that at the one year mark, one was still continuing to learn. 41 There is a process of relation-building that must occur to operate effectively. Thus, tour lengths for interagency representatives should mirror those of our military. The current 4-6 month rotation is not long enough to develop the level of expertise and the depth of relationships required to conduct successful counter-insurgency and stability operations.
Sixth, we must intensify our efforts to work with the community of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and ensure that we are attempting to achieve the same shared sense of purpose as we have in our recent directives. The challenge here is that many NGOs believe that they cannot allow themselves to be associated with a belligerent or occupying force out of concern that they will forfeit their "humanitarian space" in which they perceive they can operate with relative security. 42 Another, more accurate perspective may be that aid, a reconstruction project, or action which would lend credibility to indigenous governmental institutions are perceived as hostile acts and compromise the security of NGOs, regardless of their affiliation with a military force. 43 Inroads can be made in this arena by soliciting NGOs for advice and assistance in the planning process of SSTR operations, inclusion into mission rehearsal exercises prior to deployment, and most importantly, ready access to information and capabilities that military forces possess uniquely. These include intelligence, aviation support, and inclusion in a development and counter-insurgency strategy. It is the military's responsibility to "sell" the legitimacy of their intentions and goals with NGOs, whose ultimate goals are likely to be complementary.
Seventh, include stability and reconstruction into all officer education and senior noncommissioned officer training. This would start with second lieutenants at the basic officer courses. They are the leaders who will execute, and ultimately, make or break the success of a SSTR operation. These tasks would be trained in addition to, and not in lieu of, core war police, and engineers), there is still likely to be a shortage. As with developing civilian capacity, it will take time to grow this increased capability through recruitment, training, and most importantly, practical experience in the field. General purpose forces have the ability to do many of the same tasks required of our civil affairs, military police, and psychological operations specialists. They are doing this now. It is a matter of mindset, training, and experience.
Our nation is engaged in a grand counter-insurgency for the long term. Some have predicted this fight could last for 20-50 years. It will require the stamina and determination of the American people and free peoples throughout the world. We can only achieve this when all the elements of national and international power are working together toward a common goal.
There will be invariable friction points and stumbling blocks along the way. There is no recipe for success, but the ingredients in the cookbook need to be comprehensive and include everything we have on the shelf. The achievement of an effective joint inter-agency process is essential if we are to be successful.
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